Ultimatum: an alarming word with dark associations, especially in Central Europe. "A diplomatic note tied to a deadline, a final warning to comply with a demand, which, if not met, may lead to serious consequences, for example a war." This is the first dictionary definition. The next is: "A final order or warning accompanied by a threat."
It is not clear in what terms Viktor Orban sees the ultimatum he has just issued to the leadership of the Socialist Party. He has demanded that the party depose Ferenc Gyurcsany, the prime minister, within 72 hours. Otherwise, Fidesz, the party Orban leads, will organise a mass demonstration in front of Parliament on Kossuth ter, which will be followed by further demonstrations if Gyurcsany remains in office. The opposition rejects the confidence vote to be held on Friday, the outcome of which is wholly predictable. Orban asks why, if Peter Medgyessy, the then prime minister, could be driven out of office by extra-parliamentary but legitimate means in August 2004, it is not now possible for the Socialist Party to do the same with the current prime minister?
Fidesz gives plenty of reasons for piling on the pressure against the governing coalition: the leaking of Gyurcsany's Oszod speech, Fidesz's large (though not complete) victory at the local elections, the speech of the president of the republic. But there is very little doubt that this ultimatum pushes the largest opposition party to the very edge of legitimacy - where one more step could send it tumbling into the ditch, taking the whole country with it.
The 2002 coalition, which had a slim majority, was shaken when Medgyessy's past as a secret police informer was revealed. When, following the Kadar era recipe, the Medgyessy government started scattering hand-outs everywhere, its position strengthened temporarily. But the coalition lost the European Parliament elections, and a while later the government was brought down in a kind of putsch.
This putsch only just remained within the confines of political legitimacy. There was no vote of confidence, the constructive vote of no confidence suggested by Medgyessy did not take place. Medgyessy simply left. This palace coup, the legality of which the departing prime minister himself questioned in public, created a precedent. The opposition expects the Socialists to repeat the performance now that Ferenc Gyurcsany has acknowledged his lying and deceit and especially after a dismal local election performance.
But precedents are only convincing when raised in court, where they can be assessed with legal precision. In everyday life, precedents are problematic and risky. There are always the problems of subjective feelings, of wounded pride, of stubbornness.
It is impossible to say when Gyurcsany will resign. It is unlikely that he will survive to the end of this parliamentary cycle, but it is equally hard to imagine that the Socialist leadership will retreat in the wake of this Friday's demonstration, or those that follow it, dropping their own redeemer. His departure, furthermore, would not solve Hungary's economic woes, since Brussels insists the convergence programme be implemented, along with all its spending cuts. For this, we need a government that is supported by the opposition, or which is at least not opposed at every turn by the opposition. It is best to avoid early elections, allowing time for an equilibrium to establish itself and for reforms to be completed.
Viktor Orban is risking everything with his ultimatum, just as Franz Josef did in July 1914 when he declared war on Serbia. Conrad von Hotzendorf, who was head of the general staff, said at the time:
"There would have been a real chance of winning the war against Serbia six years ago. Two years ago it would have been risky. But declaring war now is just double or quits." We know what happened next.
Janos Pelle