I understand that a party rally held in Buda Castle just two weeks after the elections in pouring rain is not the place for a critical assessment of the reasons for a defeat. The party leader's main task was to strengthen his folllowers in their faith. Nonetheless, I feel that if Fidesz, and Viktor Orban personally, can find no better explanation for their April fiasco than the victorious left wing's material wealth and media overrepresentation, then he and his party has already set off down the traditional road towards the trap psychologists call "wounded narcisism." The history of Hungary and of Central Europe is full of examples of misunderstood defeats which have led inexorably to new, even more serious catastrophes.
Though the Right's defeat at the hands of the Left in 2002 and 2006 cannot be considered a catastrophe, it is nonetheless worth taking a look at the Trianon trauma that continues to divide our society. An irrational attitude towards this peace treaty, which did indeed have appallingly grave consequences, continues to serve as a kind of subconcious model for today's right wing.
I believe that if Fidesz's leaders can honestly confront the real reasons for their failure to win the confidence of a majority of Hungarian voters, then in four years time they will win a parliamentary majority. But if they succumb to Trianon syndrome, then they can give up all hope of victory for ever. More precisely, if the Right ever does win power - as it must, as the pendulum swings back - then voters will be choosing not Fidesz, but a wholly different right-wing formation.
As we know, Trianon was just one of the Versailles treaties, and all of them were widely criticised. On the losing side, the Germans, the Hungarians and the Turks were dissatisfied with their treaties. But even the victorious countries, including both the Italians and - yes! - the Romanians, were discontent. But it was only in Hungary that the peace treaty was seen as the most terrible blow in all history, as an act of evil comparable to the crucifixion of Christ.
This interpretation of the way in which Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and one third of its Hungarian-speaking population ignored the fact that the minorities of Hungary had first demanded independent states for themselves in 1848, and that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was still unable to meet this demand 60 years later, when the monarchy finally fell. The problem that neither Budapest nor Vienna had ever made a serious attempt to resolve was finally settled by external force - even if at the price of drawing up unjust borders. After the trials of the war and the strains of revolutions, the Hungarian public was simply unable to deal with the fact that the cause of this trauma lay not outside, but within their nation. This absence of self-examination went hand in hand with a furious hunt for scapegoats and a desire for revenge, which, in turn, led inexorably to later, catastrophic, political decisions.
Is it excessive to attribute the Fidesz leadership's attitude to its electoral defeat to Trianon syndrome? Unfortunately, there are already signs that it is not. In April, several columnists in the conservative daily Magyar Nemzet compared the election to the Battle of Thermopylae, to the defeat at Mohacs, or to the Calvary itself. Take the website kuruc.info, which claims to represent "Conservative-Christian values," but which in fact champions the "national radical" thinking of the 1920s. They are already looking for scapegoats, adopting a hysterical tone calculated to repulse centrists. Take one early reaction:
"The do-nothing opposition, the era of feeble, theatrical nationalistic sloganising, that of democracy and an anti-rightist Fidesz one-party system is at an end. The result of this criminal politics of compromise will be an even more openly Zionist system - we should have no illusions about Gyurcsany and the Szadi [Free Democrats]. There will be a Socialist-Mossad coalition. But now we have a chance for a genuine right wing, based on the Polish model, reject all compromise. If it emerges, it will raise the flag and proclaim a programme of open nationalism and self-defence. In coming years, we will see a radicalisation of the national wing, since it would be a mistake to support once again those who can talk very persuasively, but who retreat at the first sign of great power pressure... It has finally become clear that the force that pretended to be right-wing, which always played by the rules of globalisation and Zionism, cannot be authentic and neither wants nor is able to protect the interests of the Hungarian nation." ( 23.04.2006, signed by 'mb')
The writers of Kuruc Info, one of whom is Magyar Nemzet columnist Istvan Lovas, are closely linked to Magyar Nemzet, the most important right-wing newspaper. And it was Fidesz's leaders, maybe even Viktor Orban himself, who allowed the editors of a paper that deserved a better fate to adopt this editorial line.
How, in the light of all this, can we hope that a party that sees itself as a "centre-right" force can learn the lessons of its defeats in 2002 and 2006? Because this is what we need now. We must return to the recipe that led to the 1998 victory, when Fidesz still had roots in right-wing liberalism, when it still represented national intersts, while rejecting radical demagoguery. This was a party that held considerable attractions for Free Democrat voters who were outraged at their party's alliance with the Socialist party. It was also appealing to reflective centrists who yearned for security. Instead of letting the election defeat grow to mythical proportions, Fidesz should take a sober look at the causes of its defeat. Instead of stoking radical nightmares, it should reinvent itself, building on its own past.