© Dudás Szabolcs

Before we go into detail, let's get one thing straight. Szazadveg, the thinktank you are assoicated with, has always been seen as a Fidesz-linked institution. How true is this claim?

Our movement, and later Szazadveg, first as a journal, then as a political school, has been linked both historically and via various individuals to Fidesz. But we have never had any kind of institutional link with the party. I only visited the party's headquarters on Lendvai utca in 1994, after Fidesz had suffered an electoral defeat, in order to express my solidarity. Some time in 1996 we had the idea of conducting an analysis of the entire structure of the government, and I suggested it to Viktor Orban, who liked the idea. When Fidesz won in 1998, he came to me, saying it was time to put our theoretical considerations into practice. I started work on reorganising the prime minister's office, devising a government strategy, and Szazadveg carried on with its work, which I resumed after 2002. Fidesz always had doubts about us, but from the outside, especially once I became a minister, it looked like we were tied to the party. But we are just one player in the research market place, with the added burden of being accused of bias all the time.

Hir TV, which is close to Fidesz, recently canned your show, and subsequently they also kicked out your colleague, Andras Giro-Szasz. Were you too critical?

Nobody explained why they decided to break the agreement we made with Gabor Borokai. The aim of my show Political Barometer was to translate the numbers into everyday language. Occasionally, the show raised doubts. When Fidesz's message was "one camp, one flag," I pointed out that the Hungarian electoral system favoured parties able to form coalitions, and that Fidesz would never be able to win more than half the vote.

Did you tell Orban of your concerns?

We spoke a few times after the 2002 defeat, but he clearly did not agree with my view of the situation. Before the European Parliament elections in 2004 something happened. We devised a concrete manifesto in a small 10-12 member committee. Then Orban came along with his plan for a national petition, and chipped away at all our proposals. He overestimated the effectiveness of a PR-orientated campaign built on direct appeals to the voters and a good database. Fidesz often substitutes these kinds of gestures for genuine political debate. And then they promise the impossible. They said 3m people had signed the petition, the government would not be able to ignore it. The government did ignore it. In the autumn, Fidesz's leadership nourished the illusion that Gyurcsany would resign after the local elections - as if they were a third round to the general elections. He didn't resign. Now they are saying they can get rid of him if they win the referendum. He won't go - or if he does, it won't be because of the referendum.

Fidesz's claim nowadays is that living conditions have become so poor that the crisis could lead to early elections. What do you think?

Orban talks of a crisis in living conditions, but I see social tensions, some of which affect the Socialist Party's core supporters as well, but the conflict will never be enough to force the government into resigning. The only constitutional way to remove a government is for it to lose its parliamentary majority. For this to happen, Fidesz would have to build links with Socialist MPs with views close to theirs - perhaps in the fields of education, or hospital reform.

In 1998, Fidesz had a clear vision: a civic Hungary. What kind of vision is Orban offering now?

I can't see the precise contents of Orban's offering. We should see movement in the next two or three months. The problem is that Orban has set himself an ambitious target: he wants to appeal both to the radicals and to the average citizen. He's created a conglomerate with no competition on the right. Viktor still believes that if he had taken 1 per cent from MIEP, the radical Hungarian Truth and Life Party, he would have won. I believe that if we had taken that 1 per cent, we'd have lost 6 per cent from the centre and Kupa would have got into parliament or the opposition would have got two thirds of the vote. If Hungary has a serious radical right which is capable of crossing the 5 per cent barrier to get into parliament, then it's still better for it to be institutionalised, pinned down within the rules of parliamentary procedure, than for it to be left to flex its muscles on the streets. By trying to integrate this force into his own party, Orban is restricting his own freedom of manoeuvre.
The numbers seem to be backing him up. Fidesz's supporter base has grown by 500,000 voters. Why would he change things?

The 15-20 per cent lead is impressive, but we're talking only about certain voters - and there are very few of them, they make up less than half of all voters. If we ask whether the government should stay or the opposition should take power, then a relative majority still wants the government to stay.

Will anything change after new party officials have been elected?

© Dudás Szabolcs

Party congresses are not designed to bring internal disputes to the surface, but 1 October marked the beginning of a new era for Fidesz: almost 4000 Fidesz politicians have now ascended to very important positions in more than 700 different localities. This isn't primarily or exclusively because Fidesz or Orban ran a successful and popular campaign - in fact, it was their campaign that lost them the election for mayor of Budapest. The local successes were not about authority handed down from on high but about the individual hard work of many people on a local level who also benefited from a protest vote against Prime Minister Gyurscany's policies. These people have the right to feel that their success and legitimacy is the result of their own efforts. Fidesz and Orban are no longer one and the same. The party is now represented by many local politicians. In many respects, their interests are different from those of Orban with his centralised policies. They have no interest in pursuing a policy of total confrontation because this will restrict their freedom of manoeuvre.

And how can this lead to a situation where Orban is no longer the president of Fidesz?

If even he starts to feel that he's running out of air up there, and that he has no adequate responses to the challenges he's facing, then this might happen. There are some who are still confident that Orban has an incredible capacity to learn - I witnessed this at first hand when I was a minister. He soaks up information like a sponge and is able to adapt all his ideas to his new knowledge. Orban's old colleagues are incredibly loyal towards him. They almost grew up together, fought their battles together, and so there are extraordinarily strong emotional bonds between them. But the article that was recently published criticising Maria Schmidt was a definite crossing of the Rubicon. It was a declaration of war against those who, within and on behalf of Fidesz, are calling for a major change of direction. For conservative, civically ( polgári) inclined intellectuals, this is a deep blow, from which it will be difficult to recover.

Can you already see the new party elite which will replace today's?

The four years to come are going to be crucial. During this time, the potential leaders will emerge who could become decisive within Fidesz after 2010. Some of them will be city mayors who have been several times re-elected, but there will be new faces alongside these old war-horses. Maybe we don't yet know who they are, but a new team is being built, and its members know that their efforts will decide if they make a success of new opportunities, some of which will result from EU funding. So Orban, instead of stuffing the party with loyal right-hand men, should be seeking to create a new consensus within Fidesz.

JÁNOS DOBSZAY